considerable volume of writing that aims to provide such a framework, one of the dominant issues is the 'newness' of New Labour. 4 argument is itself open to a variety of potentially damaging criticisms.
First, it may be said that the distinction between 'values' (which are said to have remained constant) and policies (which are admitted to have changed), is left vague.
This, of course, is the familiar problem of ends versus means, which can never be fully resolved. Nevertheless, this vagueness helps make the 'core values' argument potentially almost infinitely malleable, and creates the risk of a Whig interpretation of the party's history. Second, some of the specific historical judgements used to back up the 'core values' approach are open to doubt, in particular the parallels drawn between the revisionists of the 1950s and the modernisers of the 1990s. Third, the decision (explicit in Fielding's work and implicit elsewhere) to concentrate on the party's parliamentary leadership inevitably brings about a misleading conclusion. 9 As
Fielding is easily able to show, 1994 did not mark the sudden emergence within the Labour Party of a previously unheralded ideology. But change did nonetheless occur:
there was a shift in the balance of forces within the party, and a focus on the ideology of the leadership alone is bound to obscure this. The article will therefore conclude by exploring the merits of Benn's remark about 'the smallest party in history'. It will be argued that 'New Labour' should be seen not as something that has superseded 'Old Labour', but as something that exists alongside it, providing leadership as part of a wider coalition.
The 'core values' argument
The charge that the key figures in New Labour are ignorant of their own party's history is quite wrong. Jack Straw, in a landmark pamphlet published in March 1993, drawing on a number of well-respected secondary works, provided a short history of 20 Blair has expressed these opinions again since, notably in his 1999 party conference speech:
100 years ago, the circumstances of our birth and our political childhood was such we never realised our potential. Born in separation from other progressive forces in British politics, out of the visceral need to represent the interests of an exploited workforce, our base, our appeal, our ideology was too narrow. … We were chained by our ideology. We thought we had eternal doctrines. When they are in truth eternal values.
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These views are shared, in broad outline, by other New Labour figures. 22 The chief aim of the historian is the elucidation of the unlikenesses between past and present and his chief function is to act in this way as the mediator between other generations and our own. It is not for him to stress and magnify the similarities between one age and another, and he is riding after a whole flock of misapprehensions if he goes to hunt for the present in the past. Rather it is his work to destroy those very analogies which we imagined to exist. extremists' in the Gaitskell coterie. 36 This was due in part to an article he wrote in
Forward after the 1959 general election, suggesting that Labour should rethink its nationalisation proposals, and should consider changing the party name to 'Labour and Radical' or 'Labour and Reform'. 37 Jay has thus been invoked by Gould as one of the 'first voices of modernizing dissent' within the Labour Party, and is cited by
Fielding as an early Labour advocate of market-based policies. 38 42 It is certainly true, though, that during the 1930s Jay was sceptical about the idea of socialist economic planning, and was willing to speak (with some key exceptions), in positive terms about the market and consumer freedom. However, the experience of WWII and the immediate post-war era converted him to the virtues of planning. 43 During the 1951-64 period he retained a firm belief in economic planning based partly on physical controls. 44 In this respect, it is difficult to claim close similarities between his views and those of New Labour.
This also applies to his views on public ownership. In 1959, responding to critics of his Forward article, he emphasized that he was by no means opposed to further public ownership, but that this should not take the form of the extension of public monopoly into manufacturing industry and the distributive trades. Rather, he argued, in a world of full employment and long-run capital gains, expanding ownership of industrial shares and other property by the community could supply the revenue for better pensions and public services without high rates of personal taxation. 45 As Jay later pointed out, his belief in 'social ownership', but not in the further extension of public monopoly, was a precursor of the National Enterprise Board (NEB) established by the 1974 Labour government. 46 The NEB -which was to acquire shares in major firmshas often been viewed as one of the excesses of Bennite interventionism. 47 Yet, in view of its origins, it is unsurprising that the policy received qualified support from the right of the party, not least because of growing doubts about the behaviour of the private sector. 48 It is easy, in the search for proto-Blairite attitudes amongst the revisionists, to forget the extent to which they still had a genuine faith in 'public enterprise'. To this degree there are problems with viewing Jay and his colleagues as prophets of New Labour.
Jay has been used here as a specific example, but similar points could be made in relation to Tony Crosland or indeed Gaitskell himself. Indeed, in 1959 Gaitskell wrote to Jay, after the latter had made a speech clarifying his own views: 'I was glad you were able to stress last night that you were not opposed to further public ownership.' 49 Thus, in spite of his determination to change Clause IV, Gaitskell had not himself abandoned public ownership. Perhaps these arguments are wrong, however, and figures like Crosland, Jenkins, and Denis Healey really were the 'Blairites' of their day. 50 But even if so, this should not be taken as overwhelming evidence of continuity between the pre-and post-1994 Labour Party. For one of the things that is most obviously different between Blair's party and Gaitskell's is that under New
Labour revisionists/modernisers find it much easier to get their way. Whereas
Gaitskell failed to change Clause IV, Blair succeeded. This is the weakness of Fielding's decision to focus mainly on the ideology of the parliamentary leadership:
for even if there has been continuity in this, as will be discussed below, the balance of forces within the party as a whole has shifted to allow this ideology to be more successfully imposed.
It must also be stressed that the 'core values' argument is politically advantageous to The 1992 election manifesto recast this idea in a more positive and concise way:
'Modern government has a strategic role not to replace the market but to ensure that the market works properly.' 69 This was an example of the tendency amongst Labour policy makers at this time to state the benefits of markets, albeit cautiously, before providing rather serious qualifications. Hence even in Jack Straw's landmark 1993 pamphlet, which daringly suggested the revision of Clause IV:
Markets plainly have an important role for transmitting consumer needs and demands, and translating those into production and distribution of goods and services. But for us, the market is no more an end in itself, an icon to worship, than was the command economy or nationalisation in former times. Markets are a means to an end, justified only by their utility. They need regulation, intervention, and control. Where we differ from the right is as to whether markets should be the servants of the masters of communities… We see the need to moderate the social consequences of an unbridled market economy. We also recognise that markets can have serious defects, and that some economic activity is not susceptible to the free market model.
Straw then went on to list areas where the operation of the market should be limited:
gas, water, electricity, railways, healthcare and scientific research. 70 Blair himself made rather more positive statements about the virtues of the market economy at this time, but his was not the dominant tone in the party until after he had become leader. 71 Only after that point did markets receive unashamed welcome, as in the new Clause IV:
… we work for: a dynamic economy, serving the public interest, in which the enterprise of the market and the rigour of competition are joined with the forces of partnership and co-operation to produce the wealth the nation needs and the opportunity for all to work and prosper, with a thriving private sector and high quality public services, where those undertakings essential to the common good are either owned by the public or accountable to them … in healthcare. 75 The contrast with, in particular, the 1945-51 government seems stark. Keir Hardie was conscious of his image. 82 Nevertheless, it seems indisputable that under Blair media management has been taken to an entirely new level. Moreover, New Labour has not acknowledged a distinction between policymaking and presentation. 83 The two, to a very novel degree, have gone hand in hand. The classic example is taxation. In opposition, Brown pledged not to increase income tax rates. It is difficult to see any rationale behind this other than the presentational, given that there was no pledge that the tax burden as a whole would not rise. It did, however, have important policy consequences, because it necessitated as an alternative what became known as 'stealth taxes', i.e. an increase in indirect taxation. Although it would be naïve to imagine that, prior to 1994, Labour politicians adopted polices entirely without reference to their vote-winning potential, it seems clear that under Blair 'substance' and 'spin' have been less divisible than in the past. Indeed -even if reports of 'government by spin doctor' and of the death of cabinet government and have been exaggerated -this has translated into a style of governing which puts great store by control of the media (and, as a by-product, by the suppression of internal party dissent). As Brown suggested to Ashdown, there was a connection between this phenomenon and New Labour's difficulties in establishing overall ideological coherence.
The issue of governing style is linked to that of more formal constitutional change.
Fielding discusses constitutional reform only in relation to Labour relationship with the Liberal Democrats. 84 Yet it appears to be one of the most obvious areas where New Labour has innovated. Admittedly, the creation of assemblies for Scotland, Parliament Act -which reduced the delaying powers of the Lords -was prompted by the desire to get iron and steel nationalisation onto the statute book in advance of a general election.) 88 But it is the sheer scale of change since 1997 that impresses. This certainly seems to mark a shift in priorities and to some extent a corresponding change in values -which is not to say this shift necessarily happened overnight when Blair became leader.
There is, of course, a whole range of issues other than these that could be examined in order to determine the novelty or otherwise of New Labour's approach. These might include welfare, 'equality', attitudes towards trades unions, and foreign policy. 
Blair's Labour Party as a coalition
Fielding has argued that the terms 'Old' and 'New' Labour 'should be dispensed with as soon as possible'. 90 It seems unlikely that this will happen -even Fielding himself uses the words '"New" Labour' in the title of his book. He is of course right that these terms have often been used incautiously; it would indeed be wrong to suggest that a monolithic 'Old Labour' party was utterly transformed into 'New Labour' under Blair's leadership. We therefore return to Tony Benn's remark about 'the smallest party in history' -one does not have to share Benn's overwhelmingly negative view of New Labour in order to see that it has considerable explanatory power. New
Labour should not be seen as entity that superseded 'Old Labour' in a total transformation of the party. Rather, it should be seen as a faction, a ginger group, a party-within-a-party, or a leadership cohort, which has governed in coalition with other groups. Likewise, 'Old Labour' should be viewed not as a pre-1994 historic entity, but as a coalition partner of New Labour, which has consented, with a degree of reluctance, to be led by the latter group. They found little sign of members displaying any more positive enthusiasm for the free market in the former year than in the latter. Although members had become far less enthusiastic about public ownership, nearly one half (49%) still desired more nationalisation. There was also little change in attitudes to trades unions. Members retained a commitment to high public expenditure, and the majority were uncritical of high levels of income tax. On the other hand, attitudes to class struggle had moderated, members felt far less strongly than before that defence expenditure should be cut; and, in 1999, there was strong support for the Blair government's tough policies on law and order. In both years, there were very strong traditionalists and very strong modernizers to be found in the grassroots party organization, but most members were in the centre. By 1999, 'Members had become uneasy about the Blair strategy of capturing the votes of middle England, but on the other hand they were not willing to contemplate losing an election by rigidly standing by their principles.'
Although the party leader was by this point seen as too powerful, members acquiesced in his strategy; that is to say, they were 'reluctant modernizers' who submitted to Blair's ideas in the interests of electoral success. 'The main symbol of our unity -of "old" and New Labour … is the both of you enjoying a close, supportive relationship … New Labour has to be a unifying factor between you (JP: "I didn't necessarily agree with him at first, but I see he is right…" TB: "We had to change but remain proud of our roots…")'. 94 It may be argued that We are doing the same in reverse.' 96 To these ends, Blair set about actively courting the Liberal Democrats, actively considering bringing them into a formal coalition even after having won a huge majority in 1997. 97 To some of his ministerial colleagues such as John Prescott, this appeared irrational. 98 Blair's cleverness in not disillusioning them too early helps explain why, although one may doubt that New Labour is literally 'the smallest party in history', it has certainly punched very powerfully above its numerical weight. Europhile Conservatives
